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Notes
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act: Consumer
Information and Warranty Regulation
On January 4, 1975, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act was signed into law. Title I of this
Act, dealing exclusively with the law of consumer warranties and service
contracts, represents the federal government's latest and perhaps most
ambitious attempt to protect consumer interests.
Prior to the enactment of federal legislation, 49 states2 relied pri-
marily on the applicable sections of the Uniform Commercial Code for
their warranty laws.3 The Code is essentially a codification of the earlier
common law of warranties which left the buyer and seller to bargain
freely over the terms of the warranty agreement. However, in that bar-
gaining process, the buyer began with certain implied warranties which
ran to him by operation of law.4 With those implied warranties as a
starting point, both the buyer and seller were free to negotiate over other
I Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (January 4, 1975) [hereinafter referred to as the
Magnuson-Moss Act or the Act]. Title I, dealing exclusively with consumer warranties and
service contracts, is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 (Supp. IV, 1975). Title II amends the
Federal Trade Commission Act and is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 44-46, 49-50, 52, 56-58
(Supp. IV, 1975). The scope of this note is limited to a discussion of the disclosure and
regulatory provision of Title I of the Act.
2 Only Louisiana has not adopted the UNironr COMMERCIAL CODE [hereinafter referred
to as the CODE or U.C.C. See CCH PRODUCrS LiArmrr REPORTS 111020. However, sev-
eral states have altered the CODE'S provisions dealing with consumer warranties. See, e.g.,
CAL. Crv. CODE §§ 1791 et seq. (West 1973); VID. Comm. LAw CODE ANN. § 2-316.1 (1975);
MsS. ANN. LAws ch. 106 § 2-316A (Supp. 1974).
a Several of the CODES warranty provisions, pertinent to the scope of Title I of the Act,
are discussed briefly. See notes 4 & 6-8 infra & text accompanying. There are several
sources offering more extensive treatment of the operation of warranties under the CODE.
See, e.g., J. WHITE & R. SUMM RS, UxrroiR COM RCIAL CODE 271-396 (1972).
4The CODE provides for two types of warranties dealing with the quality of goods,
which may be implied by law even though the seller has not undertaken to make any ex-
press warranties. UNo.M COrrcERMAr CODE § 2-314 provides that goods sold by a "mer-
chant" (defined at Ururonm COMERCIA CODE § 2-104) will be "merchantable," i.e., they
will be "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used." Furthermore, UNI-
roRM CO MMRCIAL CODE § 2-315 provides that where the seller has reason to know that
the buyer needs the goods for a particular purpose and is relying on the seller's skill to
select such goods, a warranty is implied that the goods provided will be fit for that par-
ticular purpose.
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terms which they desired with an implied common goal of attaining the
optimal risk allocation."
In practice, optimal risk allocation often results in sellers bargain-
ing for a modification or limitation of the implied warranties or, per-
haps, a total disclaimer of all warranties.6 If the seller is successful in
negotiating such terms, he avoids the risk of product non-conformity
by placing the risk on the buyer.7
The buyer is also free to bargain over the terms of the warranty.
Where it fits his needs, e.g., to minimize his risk of loss, the buyer can,
theoretically, exact express warranties 8 from the seller in addition to
those implied by law. The success of either party in attaining the de-
sired terms rests upon their relative bargaining positions.
This scheme of free bargaining, as embodied in the Code, has been
the target of considerable criticism. With the increased industrialization
of the nation, accompanied by the more generalized use of "form" con-
tracts, this criticism has increased. The critics contend that consumers
are no longer able to bargain with the large and impersonal corpora-
tions with which they are forced to do business. Perhaps the critics are
5 Cf. G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 21 (1970). The term is used here as a
goal to be achieved by placing the risks of non-conformity in the goods, i.e., the possibility
of defect or malfunction, on the party who can most cheaply bear the cost of those risks
either by spreading the costs or by avoiding them through their own efforts.
6 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316 allowing modification or total exclusion of
the implied warranties where the disclaimer provision meets the requirements set forth
in the section. Primarily, the section requires that a disclaimer, to he valid, must be
conspicuous.
7 The seller is also free to bargain for terms which would limit his liability for conse-
quential damages in the event of breach of warranty. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§§ 2-316(4), 2-718, 2-719, providing that the normal contract remedies available in the
event of a breach of warranty may he altered by contractual arrangement.
8 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313. Under this section a seller may create an
express warranty in three ways if his action becomes a part of the basis of the bargain:
(1) by affirmation of fact or promise relating to the goods,
(2) by giving a description of the goods, and
(3) by displaying a sample or model of the goods.
In each instance the action taken creates an express warranty that the goods will conform
to the action.
9 See, e.g., Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract,
43 CoLum. L. REv. 629 (1943); Note, Disclaimers of Warranty in Consumer Sales, 77 HARv.
L. RE V. 318 (1963); Comment, Consumer Protection and Warranties of Quality: A Pro-
posal for a Statutory Warranty in Sales to Consumers, 34 ALBANY L. REV. 339 (1970). The
critics generally argue that even if contracts of adhesion, i.e., most "form" contracts, do not
foreclose most bargaining opportunities, still, the "unequal bargaining power" which con-
sumers possess in relation to large corporations will effectively deny any meaningful nego-
tiation. On this basis, the CODE'S warranty provisions are attacked as offering no protection
for consumers. To correct the problem, it has been proposed that minimum mandatory
warranties be provided, either by prohibiting the use of disclaimers, which would have the
effect of creating mandatory warranties with terms equal to the implied warranties of the
CODE, or by an affirmative mandatory warranty with terms determined by statute. Com-
pare Note supra, at 327-28 with Comment supra, at 371.
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right. Two major studies conducted in the late 1960's by the Federal
Trade Commission revealed considerable consumer dissatisfaction with
warranties as they exist under the Uniform Commercial Code."0 The
reports disclosed a substantial number of consumer- complaints concern-
ing manufacturers' performance under warranty provisions and con-
cluded that only legislative action would cure the problem."
Spurred by the FTC reports, Congress initiated public hearings on
several bills designed to revamp the warranty laws and to provide na-
tional legislation designed to effectuate the consumer need for more
adequate post-sales protection.' Representatives from government, busi-
ness, and consumer organizations were all present at the hearings to
urge their views as to the type and extent of protection needed. As each
of these groups generally differ in their views on the type and extent
of protection desirable, the real issue became not whether consumers
would receive protection, but rather in what form and to what extent
the protection would be provided.' 3
10 See FTC, REPORT ON AuToIoBILE WARRANTES (1970); FTC, STAFF REPORT ON A To-
MOBLE WAMMNTS (1968). A preliminary investigation of automobile warranties was
begun in July 1965. Such a large number of complaints were recorded that a full investi-
gation was ordered in July 1966, culminating with the findings of the 1968 STAPP REPORT,
supra. The drastic cut back in warranty coverage by automobile manufacturers in 1969
prompted a second study which was finished in 1970.
11 FTC, REPORT ON AUOMOBiLE WARRANTIES 70 (1970). The report concluded:
The Commission will, of course, continue to utilize all process [sic] available
to it under existing law to eliminate deception in the automobile warranty area.
Nevertheless, this cannot serve as a substitute for the legislation recommended in
this report.
Id.
12 As early as 1967, bills had been introduced which were designed to alleviate the
problems commonly associated with automobile warranties. See generally Magnuson, Fed-
eral Developments in Product Warranty Law, 4 U.C.C.L.J. 279 (1972). However, it was
not until 1970 and later that the congressional hearings began to focus on the bills which
were to become the forerunners of the present Magnuson-Moss Act. E.g., see generally
Hearings on H.R. 20 and H.R. 5021 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of
the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); Hear-
ings on H.R. 6313, HiR. 6314, H.R. 261, HiR. 4809, Hi. 5037, HiR. 10673 (and similar
and identical bills) Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm.
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972); Hearings on S. 3074 Be-
fore the Consumer Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970).
1 3 Compare D. AAram & G. DAY, CONSUARmIuSM: SEARCH rOR r"a CONSUMa INTEREST
4 (1971) [hereinafter cited as CONSUMRISM], with Bauer & Greyser, The Dialogue That
Never Happens, 45 HARV. Bus.'REv. 2 (Nov.-Dec. 1967), reprinted in CONSuMERism at 63,
and Stern, Consumer Protection Via Increased Information, 31 J. or AWiarmNG 48 (April
1967), reprinted in CONSUMERSms at 103. In general, the position of "business" has been
that the consumer receives adequate protection from the combination of existing laws and
the use of his own judgment of the reputation of the brand or manufacturer. On the other
hand, the consumer organizations insist that the consumer be given more detailed informa-
tion on product performance characteristics as well as minimum mandatory warranties. The
minimum mandatory warranties would be derived by either direct regulation of warranty
terms or a total prohibition on the use of disclaimers. As in the case of most legislation,
1976]
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The provisions of Title I of the Magnuson-Moss Act, 4 which be-
came partially effective on July 4, 1975, represent the culmination of
those proceedings and the legislative compromise of the competing in-
terests. The purpose of Title I is "to make warranties on consumer
products more readily understood and enforceable [and] to provide the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) with means of better protecting con-
sumers .... "15 More specifically, the warranty provisions are designed
"to impose the consumer's position" in the marketplace in such a way
as to enable him to make more informed product choices, to promote
"better product reliability," and to provide more "assurance of warranty
performance.' 6 In an attempt to effectuate these goals Congress has
adopted a threefold approach employing disclosure requirements,"' regu-
latory provisions,'" and new remedial avenues.' The result is a welter
of compromises which may actually worsen rather than better the con-
sumer's position.2" The ensuing analysis will illustrate the limited effec-
the government is left to effect compromiszs between the various conflicting views, hoping
in the process to make the system more efficient.
14 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 (Supp. IV, 1975).
15 H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 20 (1974), reprinted in 4 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 7702, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
6 Magnuson, Federal Development in Product Warranty Law, 4 U.C.C.L.J. 279, 294
(1972). Senator Magnuson's article deals with S. 986, a forerunner of the Magnuson-Moss
Act. The similarity between the bills would indicate that the same rationale is applicable
to both. See also 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a) (Supp. IV, 1975) which provides in part:
In order to improve the adequacy of information available to consumers, pre-
vent deception, and improve competition in the marketing of consumer products,
any warrantor . . . shall . . . disclose . . . the terms . . . of such warranty.
17 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 2302,-03,-06 (Supp. IV, 1975). Section 2302 is the basic dis-
closure provision of the Act. All of the disclosure provisions and the FTC's final rules im-
plementing them are discussed in detail at notes 30-50 infra & text accompanying.
18 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 2304,-08 (Supp. IV, 1975). See also notes 51-58 infra & text
accompanying.
19 See 15 U.S.C. § 2310 (Supp. IV, 1975).
Congress expressly encouraged warrantors to implement informal dispute settlement
mechanisms to handle consumer complaints. As long as the mechanism is incorporated into
the warranty, so that the consumer is aware of its existence and operation, and meets the
rules promulgated by the FTC on the implementation and operation of such mechanisms,
the consumer, whether acting individually or as a class, will generally be required to initially
pursue his remedy through that mechanism prior to instituting other legal action available
under the Act's provisions. The Act does not appear to foreclose consumer action under
other laws prior to resorting to the informal mechanism established by the warrantor. 40
Fed. Reg. 60190 (1975).
Federal district courts have jurisdiction under the Act in actions brought by the U.S.
Attorney General or the FTC to restrain any warrantor from making a deceptive warranty
or any person from violating the provisions of Title I of the Act. Consumers are able to
bring suit under Title I in any state court. In addition, they may resort to suit in federal
district court if (1) all individual claims exceed $25, (2) the aggregate amount in contro-
versy is in excess of $50,000, and (3) in the case of class actions, there are in excess of
100 plaintiffs involved. Consumers prevailing in any action brought under Title I may, in
the court's discretion, be allowed to recover costs and expenses, including attorney fees.
2 0 A common assumption which government, business, and consumers all apparently
share is that society will best be served if its limited resources are allocated in the most
efficient manner possible within our economic system. The same assumption is evident
400
1976] MAGNUSON-MOSS WARRANTY ACT
tiveness of the disclosure requirements and regulatory provisions of the
Act in achieving the stated goals. The third approach, new remedial
avenues, is dealt with only as it relates to the other two.
REQUIRED INFORMATION IN SELECTING WARRANTY TERMS:
A THEORETICAL MODEL
Our market system has been appropriately described as a "system
of mutual coercion based on power" where coercion is defined as the
effect one market segment's choices have on other segments, and power
is defined as the means to exercise those choices.2 1
Information is one item which can effect the relation of power and
coercion among the various market segments by making some choices
appear more or less desirable than they would have without the infor-
mation. Thus, adequate information is an important source of power
for consumers, and without such information, consumers are unable to
make informed and intelligent purchase decisions.-2
A simple purchase decision, broken down into its separate elements,
should reveal the type of information needed in order to insure that an
intelligent decision is made. For example, suppose that a consumer de-
cides that he needs a gadget. Few consumers have such infinite re-
sources that they can afford to rush out and purchase the first gadget
they can find. Initially, it will be necessary for the consumer to deter-
mine exactly what needs the gadget is to fulfill, and on that basis the
consumer will determine what characteristics the gadget must possess
throughout this note. The controversy turns, instead, on who is to determine what con-
stitutes efficient allocation of resources, and once that is determined, how the allocation is
to be effected.
This note accepts the assumption implied by the UNIoRm COMMERCIAL CODE that
within our economic system, the most efficient manner of allocation will be realized by
allowing individuals to bargain freely. By allowing individuals, who presumably best know
their own needs and the resources available to satisfy those needs, to bargain freely, the
bargaining will be conducted in a manner calculated to best satisfy those needs with the
least possible expenditure of resources. One result of such bargaining in connection with
warranties (or other forms of post-sales protection such as service contracts) is to place
the risk of non-conformity, which is inherent in nearly all bargaining transactions, on the
party who can most cheaply bear or avoid the risk, i.e., optimal risk allocation would be
effected.
Before this free bargaining process will operate as theorized, however, the bargaining
parties must possess equal knowledge of the alternatives available to them. Without the
necessary information the bargaining system does not work properly. In order to achieve
the efficiency desired either the needed information must be made available or some other
method of allocation must be adopted. See Schwartz, The Private Law Treatment of Defec-
tice Products in Sales Situations, 49 I.n. L.J. 8, 56 (1974). The issue is whether the Mag-
nuson-Moss Act accomplishes either of these objectives.
2 1 Randall, Information, Power and Academic Responsibility, 56 Amrm. 3. AGR. EcoN.
227, 229 (1974).2 2 See Schwartz, supra note 20, at 29-30. See generally Randall, supra note 21.
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in order to fulfill those needs. Suppose the following characteristics are
deemed to be essential in this case:
1) a square design,
2) a blue and white finish,
3) one moveable part constructed of solid steel, and
4) a useful life of at least two years.
Given these desired characteristics, the consumer enters the gadget mar-
ket to find the cheapest gadget available which meets all of these criteria.
Suppose the consumer finds that three gadgets are on the market
all of which have a square design, a blue and white finish, and one
movable part constructed of solid steel. Gadget A is priced at $80 and
bears a disclaimer of all warranties. Gadget B, priced at $100, is cov-
ered only by the warranties of merchantability and fitness implied by
the Uniform Commercial Code.23 Gadget C is priced at $120 and has
an express warranty covering all defects for two years from the date
of purchase.24
The consumer's problem is evident. While he desires to purchase
the cheapest gadget available, it is essential that the gadget purchased
possess the necessary characteristics to satisfy his needs-that is, the
gadget must satisfy the four criteria stated above. The options are clear
but the appropriate choice is far more difficult to ascertain.
The consumer's dilemma is not a lack of bargaining power but
simply a lack of information. What he really needs is pertinent infor-
mation concerning the risk of defect in all three of the gadgets for the
two year period of anticipated use. Thus, the following information
would allow the consumer to make a completely informed decision as
to which of the gadgets would fulfill all of his needs at the lowest pos-
sible price:
1) the probability that a defect will occur within the next two years,
2) the probable cost of the damage a defect would cause,
3) the charge the seller would impose for bearing the risk,
4) the cost of avoiding the risk through his own efforts (if possi-
ble), and
5) the cost of shifting the risk to some third party. 5
By way of illustration, assume that the following information is
available on gadget A:
23 See note 4 supra.
24 See note 8 supra.
25 Schwartz, supra note 20, at 12-13 & n.n.10-11.
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1) The probability of a defect occurring over the two-year period
is thirty percent.
2) The probable cost of damage is $50.
3) The seller will bear the risk for a cost of $40 (i.e., $15 for
the actual cost of the risk (30% of $50) plus $25 for transaction costs26
and profits).
4) The cost of avoiding the risk through his own efforts is $10.
For example, $10 could be the cost of a special lubricant which if ap-
plied to the gadget regularly over the two year period will reduce the
probability of a defect occurring to zero.
5) The cost of shifting the risk to a third party is $20. For exam-
ple, a local repair shop will sell a service contract at that price since
they know that the cost of the risk is $15 and that they can cover their
transaction costs and profits with the additional five dollars.
Given this information, the consumer knows that he has four al-
ternatives all of which will have the same effect :2
1) pay the seller $40 to bear the risk for a total cost of $120, or
2) pay the third party $20 for a two year service contract for a
total cost of $100, or
3) pay $10 for the special lubricant and avoid the risk by his own
efforts for a total cost of $90, or
4) accept the risk himself at a cost of $80 out of pocket and the
30 percent chance that it will cost another $50 sometime during the
next two years-thus, a total cost of $95.
Given this same information on the other two products the con-
sumer would have all of the information necessary to make a fully in-
formed decision. With this information the consumer gains the power2"
to choose among alternatives which were otherwise unknown to him.
Furthermore, if enough buyers exercise their choice, sellers will be
coerced2" into giving them what they want, thus maximizing consumer
satisfaction and providing for the most efficient allocation of consumer
resources. Furthermore, sellers, if they are to maintain a competitive
2 6 In altering the terms of the sale so that the seller will bear the risks, it is assumed
that the seller will incur costs which would otherwise be unnecessary. This may result, e.g.,
from additional administrative or operating costs. The sum of these additional costs are
referred to as transaction costs. See also G. CALABRESI, TaE COSTS oF AccENrTs 139-38
(1970).
27 Any one of the four alternatives will produce the same results in that the buyer will be
protected against a non-conformity in the gadget for two years of anticipated use. Thus
the buyer would choose the cheapest method-in this case the third alternative.28 See note 21 supra.
2 9 See note 21 supra & text accompanying.
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standing, will be "coerced" into offering high quality merchandise, i.e.,
merchandise which exposes the manufacturer to the lowest net potential
liability and/or the consumer to the lowest net costs attributable to the
non-conformity. This enchanced "quality" will be effected either by
reducing the rate of non-conformity or by reducing the costs which re-
sult when a non-conformity is found to exist. Thus, information dis-
closure elevates the importance of product quality and efficient resource
allocation in sales transactions.
INFORMATION DISCLOSURE UNDER THE MAGNUSON-MOSS ACT
The preceding section dealt with the type of information which a
consumer 30 must have in order to make an informed and intelligent de-
cision when bargaining for warranty terms or in determining which
warranty offer best fulfills his needs. Since it is one of the stated goals
of the Magnuson-Moss Act to enable consumers to make informed pur-
chase decisions, it seems logical that the Act's disclosure provisions
would require warrantors3' to make that information available to con-
sumers. However, while the Act does insure that more information is
made available, it falls short of requiring all of the information neces-
sary for a fully informed decision.
Section 102 of the Act provides that "any warrantor warranting a
consumer product ... by means of a written warranty shall, to the ex-
tent required by rules of the Commission, fully and conspicuously dis-
close in simple and readily understood language the terms and condi-
tions of such warranty."32 The Act delineates 13 items as illustrative
of the type of information33 which the Federal Trade Commission might
30 A consumer is defined by the Magnuson-Moss Act as
a buyer (other than for purposes of resale) of any consumer product, any person
to whom such product is transferred during the duration of an implied or written
warranty (or service contract) applicable to the product, and any other person
who is entitled by the terms of such warranty (or service contract) or under ap-
plicable State law to enforce against the warrantor (or service contractor) the
obligations of the warranty (or service contract).
15 U.S.C. § 2301(3) (Supp. IV, 1975).
31 A warrantor is defined by the Act as
any supplier or other person who gives or offers to give a written warranty or
who is or may be obligated under an implied warranty.
15 U.S.C. § 2301(5) (Supp. IV, 1975).
A supplier is defined by the Act as
any person engaged in the business of making a consumer product directly or in-
directly available to consumers.
15 U.S.C. § 2301(4) (Supp. IV, 1975).
32 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a) (Supp. IV, 1975).
3 3 The items are examples only and are not meant to limit the power granted to the
FTC under the Act to determine what information will finally be required. The Act pro-
vided the following items:
[Vol. 51:397
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want to require that warrantors disclose when offering written warran-
ties on consumer products.34 Note, however, that none of the 13 items
listed requires more than that the consumer be informed of the type of
warranty being offered. No disclosure of information is recommended
which would enable a consumer to make an informed decision on whether
(1) The clear identification of the names and addresses of the warrantors.
(2) The identity of the party or parties to whom the warranty is extended.
(3) The products or parts covered.
(4) A statement of what the warrantor will do in the event of a defect, mal-
function, or failure to conform with such written warranty-at whose expense-
and for what period of time.
(5) A statement of what the consumer must do and expenses he must bear.
(6) Exceptions and exclusions from the terms of the warranty.
(7) The step-by-step procedure which the consumer should take in order to
obtain performance of any obligation under the warranty, including the identifica-
tion of any pereon or class of persons authorized to perform the obligations set
forth in the warranty.
(8) Information respecting the availability of any informal dispute settlement
procedure offered by the warrantor and a recital, where the warranty so provides,
that the purchaser may be required to resort to such procedure before pursuing any
legal remedies in the courts.
(9) A brief, general description of the legal remedies available to the consumer.
(10) The time at which the warrantor will perform any obligations under the
warranty.
(11) The period of time within which, after notice of a defect, malfunction,
or failure to conform with the warranty, the warrantor will perform any obliga-
tions under the warranty.
(12) The characteristics or properties of the products, or parts thereof, that
are not covered by the warranty.
(13) The elements of the warranty in words or phrases which would not mis-
lead a reasonable, average consumer as to the nature or scope of the warranty.
15 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(1)-(13) (Supp. IV, 1975).
34 The Act defines a written warranty as
(A) any written affirmation of fact or written promise made in connection
with the sale of a consumer product by a supplier to a buyer which relates to the
nature of the material or workmanship and affirms or promises that such material
or workmanship is defect free or will meet a specified level of performance over a
specified period of time, or
(B) any undertaking in writing in connection with the sale by a supplier of
a consumer product to refund, repair, replace, or take other remedial action with
respect to such product in the event that such product fails to meet the specifica-
tions set forth in the undertaking, which written affirmation, promise, or under-
taking becomes part of the basis of the bargain between a supplier and a buyer
for purposes other than resale of such product.
15 U.S.C. § 2301(6) (Supp. IV, 1975).
A consumer product is defined as
any tangible personal property which is distributed in commerce and which is
normally used for personal, family, or .household purposes (including any such
property intended to be attached to or installed in any real property without re-
gard to whether it is so attached or installed).
15 U.S.C. § 2301(1) (Supp. IV, 1975). The Federal Trade Commission has made it clear,
however, that for the purposes of the rules governing disclosure and pre-sale availability of
terms, "[products which are purchased solely for commercial or industrial use are ex-
cluded . .. ." 40 Fed. Reg. 60170 (1975).
1976]
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to accept the risk himself, i.e., either to bear it or avoid it through his
own efforts or to seek to shift the risks to the seller or other third party.
3 5
The Federal Trade Commission recently published the final rules
which will govern the disclosure of information under the Act."8 The
Commission has determined that all written warranties offered on con-
35 See note 25 supra & text accompanying.
36 See 40 Fed. Reg. 60188 (1975) (the rules will be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 701 et seq.).
The final rules promulgated by the FTC provide that as of December 31, 1976, the follow-
ing items of information will be required:
(a) Any warrantor warranting to a consumer by means of a written war-
ranty a consumer product actually costing the consumer more than $15.00 shall
clearly and conspicuously disclose in a single document in simple and readily under-
stood language, the following items of information: (1) The identity of the party
or parties to whom the written warranty is extended, if the enforceability of the
written warranty is limited to the original consumer purchaser or is otherwise
limited to persons other than every consumer owner during the term of the
warranty;
(2) A clear description and identification of products, or parts, or characteris-
tics, or components or properties covered by and where necessary for clarification,
excluded from the warranty;
(3) A statement of what the warrantor will do in the event of a defect, mal-
function or failure to conform with the written warranty, including the items or
services the warrantor will pay for or provide, and, where necessary for clarifica-
tion, those which the warrantor will not pay for or provide;
(4) The point in time or event on which the warranty term commences, if
different from the purchase date, and the time period or other measurement of
warranty duration;
(5) A step-by-step explanation of the procedure which the consumer should
follow in order to obtain performance of any warranty obligation, including the
persons or class of persons authorized to perform warranty obligations. This in-
cludes the name(s) of the warrantor(s), together with: the mailing address(es)
of the warrantor(s), and/or the name or title and the address of any employee
or department of the warrantor responsible for the performance of warranty obli-
gations, and/or a telephone number which consumers may use without charge to
obtain information on warranty performance;
(6) Information respecting the availability of any informal dispute settlement
mechanism elected by the warrantor in compliance with Part 703 of this subchapter;
(7) Any limitations on the duration of implied warranties, disclosed on the
face of the warranty as provided in Section 108 of the Act, accompanied by the
following statement:
Some states do not allow limitations on how long an implied warranty
lasts, so the above limitation may not apply to you.
(8) Any exclusions of or limitations on relief such as incidental or consequen-
tial damages, accompanied by the following statement, which may be combined
with the statement required in sub-paragraph (7) above:
Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of incidental or con-
sequential damages, so the above limitation or exclusion may not apply
to you.
(9) A statement in the following language:
This warranty gives you specific legal rights, and you may also have other
rights which vary from state to state.
(b) Paragraph (a) (1)-(9) of this Section shall not be applicable with re-
spect to statements of general policy on emblems, seals or insignias issued by third
parties promising replacement or refund if a consumer product is defective, which
statements contain no representation or assurance of the quality or performance
characteristics of the product; provided that (1) the disclosures required by para-
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sumer products costing more than $1537 must include the required
information and that the information must be made available to the
consumer prior to the sale of the product. 8  The FTC rules indicate
that the information required will closely parallel the illustrations set
forth in the Act and thus will be directed solely to the conventional
terms of the warranty offered rather than to information concerning
the risks of non-conformity.
In addition to the disclosure requirements of Section 102, Section
103 of the Act requires that all written warranties given on consumer
products costing more than $10 shall be clearly labeled as either "full"
or "limited" warranties.9 A "full" warranty will have to meet the
minimum requirements set forth in Section 10440 of the Act. All war-
ranties not meeting this minimum standard must be labeled "limited,"
and any warrantor using the "full" warranty designation will be re-
graph (a) (1)-(9) are published by such third parties in each issue of a publica-
tion with a general circulation, and (2) such disclosures are provided free of charge
to any consumer upon written request.
Id.
7 40 Fed. Reg. 60188 (1975). The Act provides that the disclosure provisions apply
only to written warranties given on consumer products costing more than $5. 15 U.S.C.
§ 2302(e) (Supp. IV, 1975). At the insistence of several representatives of business interests
testifying on the Commission's proposed rules, see 40 Fed. Reg. 29892, the FTC has con-
strued the Act as giving them the authority to set a minimum higher than $5, thus, the
$15 minimum. The $5 provision of the Act was construed to mean only that Congress
meant to exclude all items costing less than that amount, not that Congress wanted to in-
clude all products priced above that amount. See 40 Fed. Reg. 60171-2 (1975). The cor-
rectness of the FTC's interpretation is certainly subject to considerable debate, as the Act
appears clear on its face.
3s See 40 Fed. Reg. 60189-90 (1975). The duties which are placed on warrantors and
sellers to insure pre-sale availability of warranty terms become effective December 31, 1976.
39 15 U.S.C. § 2303 (Supp. IV, 1975).
40 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (Supp. IV, 1975). The requirements imposed by that section are:
(a) In order for a warrantor warranting a consumer product by means of a
written warranty to meet the Federal minimum standards for warranty-
(1) such warrantor must as a minimum remedy such consumer product within
a reasonable time and without charge, in the case of a defect, malfunction, or
failure to conform with such written warranty;
(2) notwithstanding section 2308(b) of this title, such warrantor may not
impose any limitation on the duration of any implied warranty on the product;
(3) such warrantor may not exclude or limit consequential damages for breach
of any written or implied warranty on such product, unless such exclusion or limita-
tion conspicuously appears on the face of the warranty; and
(4) if the product (or a component part thereof) contains a defect or mal-
function after a reasonable number of attempts by the warrantor to remedy de-
fects or malfunctions in such product, such warrantor must permit the consumer
to elect either a refund for, or replacement without charge of, such product or part
(as the case may be). The Commission may by rule specify for purposes of this
paragraph, what constitutes a reasonable number of attempts to remedy particular
kinds of defects or malfunctions under different circumstances. If the warrantor
replaces a component part of a consumer product, such replacement shall include
installing the part in the product without charge.
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garded, for purposes of legal action, as having incorporated the provi-
sions of the minimum warranty.4'
The information provided by the disclosure and labeling provisions
of the Act have the potential to aid the consumer in determining exactly
what type of warranty the warrantor is offering and what the terms of
the warranty are. To that extent consumers will be able to make more
reliable comparisons between similar products which have differing war-
ranty terms. Still, maximum efficiency under a free bargaining process
will not be achieved until warrantors either voluntarily or by statute
are required to divulge the information necessary for consumers to be
able to ascertain and compare the risks associated with each product.'
41 15 U.S.C. § 2304(e) (Supp. IV, 1975).
42 In some cases maximum efficiency may not be achieved by requiring the disclosure
of the necessary risk information. If the transaction costs, see note 26 supra, involved in
gathering and disclosing the necessary risk information are unreasonably large, they may
offset the gains in efficiency derived by the free bargaining process. In those cases an alter-
native method of allocation will be necessary to achieve maximum efficiency. Of the four
most obvious alternatives, the first three would require direct government regulation or
judicial decision. But cf. Schwartz, Products Liability and Judicial Wealth Redistribution,
51 IND. L.J. - (1976) [forthcoming] opposing wealth redistributions by judicial deci-
sion. The four alternatives are:
(1) Provide by government regulation that warrantors must disclose the in-
formation despite the costs involved. Warrantors would then pass the costs on to
users of the product through increased product prices where possible. By defini-
tion this alternative is grossly inefficient because the savings to be gained by dis-
closure will be less than the cost of disclosing.
(2) Provide by regulation that the government will collect and disseminate the
necessary information. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act
§ 201, 15 U.S.C. § 1941 (Supp. 1973). In this case the government would pass
the costs through to all consumers through taxation. This alternative is perceived
to be more inefficient than the previous alternative for two reasons. First, the
savings provided by the information are still, by definition, less than the cost.
Secondly, passing the cost on by general taxation would result in externalizing the
costs through a universe of cost bearers which is likely to be much broader than
the anticipated universe of product users. See generally G. CALABRESI, THE COST
or ACCIDENTS 144-50 (1970).
(3) Provide no information but require all warrantors to bear the risks of non-
conformity in consumer sales transactions. This alternative avoids the inefficiencies
of the first two methods-i.e., neither warrantors nor government will be spend-
ing more dollars to discover and disclose risk information than the risk information
will save. Furthermore, unlike an alternative where the government would become
an insurer, bearing all the actual costs of non-conformity, this alternative would
require warrantors to internalize the costs of non-conformity, spreading them only
to actual users of the product. Thus, the price of the product should more truly
reflect its actual cost because the price will not be subsidized by an overly broad
cost bearing class. See CALABRESI, supra. Given a lack of necessary risk informa-
tion at a reasonable cost, this alternative is perceived to be the most efficient
method of allocating the risks involved. This approach seemingly is partially
utilized by the regulatory provisions of the Magnuson-Moss Act, see notes 51-59
supra & text accompanying, but apparently its use is based on a different reason-
ing which may explain why the Act falls short of achieving its stated goals. See
note 56 supra.
(4) The fourth alternative is to provide no information and to allow the risks
to be disclaimed, thus, causing the buyer to bear all risks in many sales transac-
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With all of the necessary information available, it would be pos-
sible to create a separate market dealing solely in post-sales protection.
Several businesses have already approximated this approach by offering
service contracts through which, for a given price, they will undertake
all risks of defect or malfunction in the product over the period of time
covered by the agreement. 43 If the information on which these businesses
determine their prices for the service contracts was generally available,
entry into the market by other businesses would be facilitated and com-
peting service arrangements would result. As a result, the forces of
competition should produce better post-sales protection at the lowest cost
possible. In addition, consumers, because they would have the informa-
tion available to them, would be able to join in this risk shifting market,
accepting the risk themselves where it would be less expensive for them
to either bear or avoid the risk through their own efforts. The advan-
tage, then, of creating a separate market for post-sales protection would
be the accomplishment of those goals listed previously as the reasons for
the enactment of the Magnuson-Moss Act.44 The availability of infor-
mation would enable consumers to make more informed purchase deci-
sions, and the forces of a competitive market would require that more
reliable products be manufactured and better performance by warrantors
be given.
In order for such a market to operate efficiently, it must have a
number of members vying to bear the risks involved. But, of course,
before consumers or third parties could enter such a market, it would
be necessary for them to be privy to the information which only the
warrantors currently have. Although many businesses are showing a
propensity toward creation of a separate post-sales protection market, it
is highly doubtful that they will divulge the information necessary for
others to enter the market until they are required to do so by statute.
By retaining the information without disclosure they can effectively
maintain a monopoly on the post-sales protection market of their prod-
ucts to the detriment of the consumer.45
tions. Of course, without the information, the value of the risks will be unknown
to the buyer. Furthermore, most buyers are ill equipped to avoid or spread the
costs involved. This alternative is perceived to be the least efficient of all.
43 Of course, present service contracts would not cover the consequential damages re-
sulting from accidents due to non-conformity.
44 See notes 15-16 supra.
45 See Rhoades, Reducing Consumer Ignorance: An Approach and Its Effect, 20 AN'n-
TRUST B'LL. 309, 310 (1975). It could be argued that if the present businesses offering
service contracts truly have a monopoly on the post-sales protection market for their
products, they will charge monopoly prices and enjoy monopoly profits. The monopoly
profits would in turn attract other businesses which would enter the market by attaining
the necessary information through means other than disclosure by the original warrantor.
The problem with this argument is the high entry cost involved in entering the market.
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It is also doubtful whether the Federal Trade Commission would,
granting that they have the power, force the disclosure of the needed
information .4  However, such power is vested in the Congress 47 and
should be employed to amend the Act so as to require disclosure of this
information. It is conceivable that requiring warrantors to make this
information available would entail some additional costs to them.48 In
Before an independent business could enter the market, it would be necessary to conduct
extensive and possibly lengthy tests to determine the risks of defect and probable damage
involved. It would seem that few businesses, except possibly the very largest, would be
able to make such large initial investments. A second consideration bearing on the likeli-
hood of businesses entering the market under present circumstances is the absence of mo-
nopoly profits. Even monopolists must face the problem of elastic market demand. In an
elastic market demand and profits drop sharply as the price of a product or service (such
as post-sales protection) rises past a given level.
Even putting these arguments aside, unless the present warrantors and service contrac-
tors are required to disclose the necessary information, consumers will not be able to ob-
tain it. Once it is made available to consumers, the information would, naturally, also be
available to third parties which might wish to use it to enter the market.
For a detailed look at the different forms of monopolistic markets and how they often
operate to misallocate resources see, e.g., W. ALBRECHT, JR., EcoNo sics 508, 533 (1974);
P. AscH, ECONOsNaC THEORY AND THE ANTITRUsT DmaEmA 102 (1970).
40 Ci. Elman, Administrative Reform of the Federal Trade Commission, 59 GEo. L.J.
777, 858-59 (1971).4 7 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The individual states have also been left the opening to
require the dissemination of this information. The Magnuson-Moss Act was not intended
to pre-empt state laws which provide the consumer with rights and remedies not included
in the Act. States have been only partially pre-empted in areas concerning labeling and
disclosure requirements which are different from those provisions of the Act. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 2311 (Supp. IV, 1975) which provides in part:
(b) (1) Nothing in this title shall invalidate or restrict any right or remedy of
any consumer under State law or any other Federal law.
(2) Nothing in this title (other than sections 2308 and 2304(a)(2) and (4)
of this title) shall (A) affect the liability of, or impose liability on, any person
for personal injury, or (B) supersede any provision of State law regarding conse-
quential damages for injury to the person or other injury.
(c) (1) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section and in paragraph
(2) of this subsection, a State requirement-
(A) which relates to labeling or disclosure with respect to written
warranties or performance thereunder;
(B) which is within the scope of an applicable requirement of sec-
tions 2302, 2303, and 2304 of this title (and rules implementing such sec-
tions), and
(C) which is not identical to a requirement of sections 2302, 2303, or
2304 of this title (or a rule thereunder),
shall not be applicable to written warranties complying with such sections (or rules
thereunder).
(2) If, upon application of an appropriate State agency, the Commission de-
termines (pursuant to rules issued in accordance with section 2309 of this title)
that any requirement of such State covering any transaction to which this chapter
applies (A) affords protection to consumers greater than the requirements of this
chapter and (B) does not unduly burden interstate commerce, then such State re-
quirement shall be applicable (notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of
this subsection) to the extent specified in such determination for so long as the
State administers and enforces effectively any such greater requirement.
48 Some companies may have to bear added costs in verifying and disclosing the in-
formation. In that case a higher minimum may be necessary so that low cost, low profit
items are not forced from the market.
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that event, it might be necessary to raise the minimum dollar amount
on which such requirements apply, so that only products costing in ex-
cess of $50 or $100 are affected. This would still cover the major pur-
chases which consumers make, and it is the major purchases which ap-
pear to be the primary source of the greatest consumer dissatisfaction."
Another problem which might be encountered in creating this new
market is the possibility that such information is simply not available
or at least not available on some products at a cost which is not pro-
hibitive. In those instances, a minimum warranty established by direct
government regulation may be the most attractive alternative if we are
to finally achieve maximum efficiency in our resource allocation.50 Such
regulation would also require action by Congress since the regulatory
provisions of the Magnuson-Moss Act fall far short of requiring any-
thing close to a minimum warranty.
REGULATION OF WARRANTIES BY THE MAGNUSON-MOss ACT
The Act also uses a variety of regulatory provisions in its attempt
to provide consumers with better warranty protection. In addition to
the disclosure and labeling requirements discussed previously, the Act
requires that all warranties which are labeled "full" warranties must.
comply with the minimum standards set forth in Section 104 of the
Act.5" A further requirement imposed upon "full" warranties provides
that warrantors cannot require more than mere notification by the con-
sumer as a prerequisite to securing a remedy in the event of defect, un-
less the warrantor can demonstrate that any additional duty imposed on
the consumer is reasonable.52 A warrantor is also relieved of his re-
sponsibility if he can show that the failure of the product was the result
of damage or unreasonable use in the hands of the consumer.53 In addi-
tion, the Act also prohibits warrantors from tying the benefits of any
warranty to the use of other products which are identified by brand,
trade, or corporate name.5"
Without question, the most significant regulatory provision of the
Act is the limitation on the disclaimer of implied warranties. 55 Section
49 Cf. note 10 supra as to consumer dissatisfaction with automobile warranties.
50 See note 42 supra.
5 1 See note 40 supra.
5 2 See 15 U.S.C. § 2304(b) (Supp. IV, 1975). The warrantor has a variety of forums
within which to prove that the duties are reasonable. These include rulemaking proceed-
ings, administrative or judicial enforcement proceedings (including private enforcement),
and informal dispute settlement proceedings.53 See 15 U.S.C. § 2304(c) (Supp IV, 1975).
5 4 See 15 U.S.C. § 2302(c) (Supp. IV, 1975).
5 5 See 15 U.S.C. § 2308 (Supp. IV, 1975) which provides that:
(a) No supplier may disclaim or modify (except as provided in subsection
1976]
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108 of the Act provides that warrantors making written warranties or
offering service contracts may not disclaim or modify any of the im-
plied warranties. Warrantors offering only a "limited" warranty may,
however, limit the duration of the implied warranties to the same dura-
tion as that of the "limited" written warranty provided that it would
be reasonable to do so. Any limitation would have to be effectively dis-
closed to the consumer.
It is important to note that the Act does not totally ban the use of
disclaimers. They are banned or limited only when used in connection
with the offering of written warranties or service contracts. A war-
rantor who offers a product without a written warranty would evidently
still be free to disclaim any liability resulting from non-conformity which
he might otherwise have by operation of the implied warranties. The
only apparent reason for this form of regulation of disclaimers is the
Congressional belief that warrantors were using disclaimers in such a
way as to deceive consumers.56 Sellers were offering written warranties
on their products which appeared to be giving increased protection to
consumers when in fact the written provisions of the warranty provided
that it was in lieu of all other warranties implied or expressed. The
(b) of this section) any implied warranty to a consumer with respect to such
consumer product if (1) such supplier makes any written warranty to the consumer
with respect to such consumer product, or (2) at the time of sale, or within 90
days thereafter, such supplier enters into a service contract with the consumer
which applies to such consumer product.
(b) For purposes of this title (other than section 2304(a)(2) of this title),
implied warranties may be limited in duration to the duration of a written war-
ranty of reasonable duration, if such limitation is conscionable and is set forth in
clear and unmistakable language and prominently displayed on the face of the
warranty.
(c) A disclaimer, modification, or limitation made in violation of this section
shall be ineffective for purposes of this chapter and State law.
56 See STAFF OF HOUSE INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE CoMM., SUBCO sr. ON
COMMERCE AND FINANCE, 93d CONG., 2d SEss., REPORT ON CONSUMER PRODUCT WARRANTIES
30 (1974), reprinted in 40 Fed. Reg. 60169 (1975). The report was to study warranties
then being used by business and to compare them with past warranties. The staff concluded
that there had been no change over the past 10 years designed to improve consumer satis-
faction. The report concluded that:
(A)ny actions taken on the part of manufacturers and trade associations to
clean up these guarantees during the past five years appear to have had minimal
results. These certificates, often marked 'WARRANTY' and printed on good qual-
ity paper with a fancy filigree border, in many cases serve primarily to limit obli-
gations otherwise owed to the buyer as a matter of law. This is done by dis-
claimers and exemptions and by ambiguous phrases and terms. All too often the
warranties shroud and effectively cover-up the obligations of the seller.
Id. at 30, reprinted in 40 Fed. Reg. at 60169.
Congressman Moss, a co-sponsor of the Act, reportedly declared that:
It is all but fraud when a guarantee declares in large print that the manu-
facturer is giving protection to the buyer and in the fine print attempts to take
away common-law buyer protection.
Washington Post, Sept. 19, 1974, § B, at 16, col. 1, reprinted in 40 Fed. Reg. 60169 (1975).
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other provisions of the written warranty actually provided less protec-
tion than the implied warranties would have, and the disclaimer provi-
sion took away the benefits of the implied warranties. Congress evi-
dently believed the problem to be serious enough to warrant action
and through the disclaimer provisions has attempted to foreclose such
practices.
The regulatory provisions of the Act, like the labeling and dis-
closure requirements, may provide some relief to consumers in that they
too will aid consumers in determining what the terms of the warranty
are and, therefore, work to eliminate some of the deceptive practices of
the past. However, like the labeling and disclosure requirements, the
regulatory provisions simply do not go far enough.
First, the problems associated with the use of disclaimers could
have been eliminated by requiring that the information discussed previ-
ously be provided to the public. Once adequate information has been
provided to the public, the creation of the post-sales protection market
should become a reality.57 With its creation, consumers could either
purchase warranty protection from the seller, bear or avoid the risks
through their own efforts, or try to seek out some third party who
would be willing to bear the risk for them. There would be no need
for warrantors to disclaim because they would have no liability unless
the consumer purchased a service agreement. Implied warranties would
no longer be needed as they would be replaced by the post-sales protec-
tion market.58
57 See text accompanying notes 43-45 supra. Even if third parties did not offer com-
peting service arrangements, consumers would still be able to bargain with warrantors with
full knowledge of the alternatives available to them.
5 8 The primary focus of this discusson has been upon the risks of loss engendered by
a non-conformity in a consumer product, i.e., the direct monetary damage a consumer
suffers because a product contains a defect. There also exists the possibility that a non-
conformity will cause consequential loss such as personal injuries. The most efficient allo-
cation of risks of consequential loss also requires availability of adequate risk bearing and
avoidance information. Since both the probability of consequential loss and the probable
extent of the resulting damage would generally be dependent on the individual circum-
stances of the consumer, the risk of consequential loss in any given sale would probably
not be readily ascertainable by warrantors at a reasonable cost. Since the savings pro-
duced by avoidance techniques are a product of the risk and the effectiveness of the
avoidance technique, the value of avoidance information would similarly not be readily
ascertainable for any given sale. However, warrantors should be able to determine the
probability of consequential loss and probable damage involved for the whole class of
consumers using its products. These costs would probably be most efficiently allocated by
requiring the warrantor to internalize them spreading the risk over the entire class of
consumers. Since a warrantor, other factors being equal, will sell more products if the
price of the product is lowered, it would be advantageous for him to disclose to the entire
class any known avoidance techniques, thereby reducing the risk of consequential loss. This
scheme is not as efficient as providing risk information, but where the information is not
available at a reasonable cost, minimizing concentrated losses would require that the best
cost spreader, in this case probably the warrantor, bear the risk. The strict products ha-
19761
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Secondly, all disclaimers should be prohibited where adequate in-
formation is not available at a reasonable cost. Since an informed deci-
sion is not possible without adequate information, one must focus on
the accomplishment of alternative goals. Achieving the goals of efficient
resource allocation, minimized concentrated losses, and improved product
quality requires that all disclaimers be prohibited. 9 Without disclaimers,
a minimum level of warranty protection would exist for all consumer
products equal to the level of protection provided by the present implied
warranties of the Uniform Commercial Code. Warrantors would find
it cheaper to improve their product quality than to face certain liabilities
under a mandatory warranty, and since warrantors as a class are usually
best able to spread to all of the product users the costs of damages which
do occur, a minimum of concentrated loss would result. The accomplish-
ment of these two goals would in itself serve as a more efficient alloca-
tion of resources.
CONCLUSION
The goals stated by Congress in writing the Magnuson-Moss Act
are commendable and few could debate their value to society. Unfortu-
nately, the Act falls far short of effectively implementing these goals.
If Congress is sincere in its desire to (1) aid consumers in making more
informed purchase decisions, (2) increase the quality of products, and
(3) improve the standard of warranty performance, it must assure pub-
lic access to the information necessary to effectuate such goals. The
creation of a new and separate market dealing solely in post-sales pro-
tection would be the most efficient way to achieve these results, but the
creation of such a market depends initially on the availability of the re-
quired information.
If for any reason such information will not or can not be made
available, the favored alternative is a complete ban on disclaimers. Such
a ban would at least provide a minimum level of protection to all con-
sumers even though imposing a significant restriction on contractual
freedom. But by establishing a minimum warranty through the aboli-
tion of disclaimers, the goals delineated would be aided, albeit at some
bility theory which many states have already adopted utilize this same approach in attempt-
ing to madmize resource allocation and minimize concentrated losses. Compare G. CALA-
BRESr, THE COSTS or ACCIDENTS 161-73 (1970) with Schwartz, The Private Law Treatment
of Defective Products in Sales Situations, 49 IND. L.J. 8, 27-28 (1973).
59 See note 42 supra. If consumer protection, i.e., minimized concentrated losses, efficient
resource allocation, and improved product quality, is to be achieved, the application of
the regulatory provisions of the Magnuson-Moss Act should not he dependent on the giving
of a written warranty or service contract. Instead, the provisions must apply to all con-
sumer sales transactions in which adequate risk information is not available.
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cost to efficiency. Whether the minimum warranty should consist only
of the terms now provided by the implied warranties or should incor-
porate more extensive terms such as those set out in Section 104 of the
Act is a question for Congressional resolution. A balance must be drawn
somewhere between the benefits which would be gained from such a
minimum mandatory warranty and the increased cost which consumers
would be forced to pay in order to have sellers bear the risks.
Freedom of choice based on full knowledge would appear to be
preferable to the leaden hand of Congressional regulation. But if the
information is not to be made available, at least effective regulation
would aid in achieving those goals necessary to an efficient society.
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